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uation shows the reason for the statute's provision requiring the affidavit to
be sworn to before the clerk. . .

."

If the court meant to require a lit-

eral compliance with the statute it would have been doing so in the face
of authorities which had specifically held a substantial compliance on this
point to be sufficient, Eastes v. Eastes, Brown v. Brown, Smith v. Smith,
supra. The opinion of the Supreme Court in the principal case recognizes
these authorities, but reverses the lower court on the sound ground that
there had been on the plaintiff's part not even substantial compliance with
the statutory requirements.
J. W. S.
TERMINATION OF LEASE CONTAINING COVENANT TO REPAIR OF REBUILD

BY SUBSEQUENT BUILDING CODE MAKING IMPOSSIBLE REPAIRS OR REBUILDING
ExcEPT BY MORE EXPENSIVE STRUCTUREEDS were owners of real estate in

South Bend on which was located a store building. Mayerfield (P) was the
owner of an unexpired lease for a term of 25 years which lease had been
previously assigned to him. The lease provided that in case the premises
should be rendered unfit for occupancy, by reason of fire or other casualty,
the Ds would at once repair or rebuild such portion of the building at D's
expense, and that the rent should be abated during such period that the
premises should be rendered unfit for occupancy. In 1920 Mayerfield sublet
the premises to Kuehn (P) until 1930. The original lease was executed in
1905, at which time there was no building code ordinance. In 1922 the City
Council enacted an ordinance zoning the city into fireproof limits and prohibiting the rebuilding of a building damaged more than 60 per cent by fire.
In 1926 the store building was damaged more than 60 per cent by fire.
Ds applied for a permit to rebuild which was refused by the building commissioners under the ordinance noted. Ds tore the damaged buliding down
and erected a new one which they rented to other persons. Mayerfield
brought an action for damages for breach of the lease and eviction, and
Kuehn filed a cross complaint asking damages for eviction. Held, for Ds,
that performance of the lease was rendered impossible by operation of law.
Poledor v. Mayerfield, App. Ct. of Ind. in Bane. November, 18, 1980, 173
N. E. 292.
The question presented by this case is: was the passage of the zoning
ordinance of such character that the covenantor is discharged from his covenant because of impossibility of performance by operation of law, or was
the covenant an unqualified one and the passage of the ordinance an event
which could have been anticipated and guarded against in that contract?
If the obligation which it is sought to enforce is one which is created by
the express agreement of the promisor, it is laid down as a general rule,
subject to exceptions, that subsequent impossibility does not excuse performance. Northern P. R. Co. v. American Trading Co., 195 U. S.439; Stewart
v. Stone, 127 N. Y. 500; Pratterv. Latshaw, 188 Ind. 204; Rowe v. Peabody,
207 Mass. 226; Barry v. U. S., 229 U. S.47; Central Trust Co. v. Wabash
St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 31 Fed 440; Berg v. Erickson, 234 Fed. 817; Carter v.
Wilson, 102 Kan. 200; Hay v. Holt, 91 Pa. St. 88; Parker v. Macowder, 17
R. I. 674. One of the well recognized exceptions to this rule is that where
the law forbids or prevents the performance of a promise, legal when made,
the promisor is freed from liability. Schaub v. Wright, 79 Ind. App. 56;
Burgett v. Larb, 43 Ind. App. 657; Jamieson v. Indiana Natural Gas and
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Oil Co., 128 Ind. 555; Board of Commissioners v. Young, 59 Fed. 108. Such
a change of law operates as a discharge of prior contracts which are thus
made illegal, since otherwise the law would enforce a penalty against the
promisor if he performed and award damages against him if he did not.
5 Page on Contracts, Sec. 2697. While the courts are well in accord as to
the statement of the rule, a conflict arises in determining what the parties
might have anticipated and guarded against. Two cases similar to the
principal case were decided in Iowa and Michigan in the same year. In the
Iowa case a leasee of a frame building had bound himself to replace it in
case of destruction by fire, and it was held that he was bound to build a
brick or stone building after a city ordinance had been passed prohibiting
the erection of wooden buildings. The court argued that the parties must
have known that the city could pass such an ordinance at the time they
entered into the contract. If they intended that the passage of such an
ordinance should exonerate the lessee from his covenant they should have so
stipulated. The ordinance does not render the performance of the covenant
impossible; it simply makes it more burdensome and expensive and that has
never been an excuse for nonperformance. David v. Ryan, 47 Iowa 642. An
opposite result was reached in the Michigan case in regard to a similar
covenant by the lessor on the ground that the lessor had undertaken to do
something which by change in the law had become illegal. The court emphasized the view that the lessor only undertook to replace the destroyed
building with a similar structure, and that would be inconvenient if not impossible. Cordes v. Miller, 39 Mich. 581. These two cases illustrate the
conflict. It has been said that any subsequent act or event which prevents
performance must be regarded as an operative impossibility which will
discharge the contract as it appears that the parties intended such act or
event as an implied condition subsequent upon the happening of which the
contract should be discharged. Reed v. U. S., 78 U. S. 591. Dow v. Sleepy
Eye State Bank, 88 Minn. 355; Dexter v. Norton, 47 N. Y. 62; American
Mercantile Exch. Co. v. Blurt, 102 Me. 128; Harper v. Mueller, 158 Mich.
595; Heart v. East Tennessee Brewing Co., 121 Tenn. 69. Or, if the act or
event which prevents performance is one which is not fairly within the
meaning of the contract and which the parties cannot be assumed to have
contemplated when they entered into the contract, such act or event amounts
to an operative impossibility and discharges performance. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul By. v. Hayt, 149 U. S. 1; Stewart v. Stone, 127 N. Y.
500; Dexter v. Norton, 47 N. Y. 62; Parkerv. Macomber, 17 R. I. 674. A
party may by absolute contract bind himself or itself to perform things
which subsequently become impossible or pay damages for the non-performance, and such construction is to be put upon an unqualified promise, where
the event which causes the impossibility might have been anticipated and
guarded against in the contract, or where the impossibility arises from the
act or default of the promisor. But where the event is of such character
that it cannot be supposed to have been in contemplation of the contracting
parties when the contract was made, they will not be held bound by general
words, which, though large enough to include, were not used with reference
to the possibility of the particular contingency which afterwards happens.
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. P. By. Co. v. Hogt, 149 U. S. 1; Berg v. Enikson,
234 Fed. 817. The court in the principal case is sustained by the Michigan
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case in its interpretation of what the parties did not contemplate or anticipate, but, as the Iowa case shows, an opposite result may be reached by a
different interpretation. The ultimate question then is in deciding what
parties to contract might anticipate and guard against or what they cannot
be assumed to have anticipated and guarded against.
C. F. B.
TORTS--INSURANCE-DUTY OF INSURANCE COMPANY ON RECEIPT OF AN

AYPLICATIN-M. B. made application for life insurance. Company delayed
action twenty days, and then refused the application and dispatched a substitute policy to the Indianapolis office, where it was received two days later.
No attempt was made to deliver that policy until eight days later, when an
agent calling to deliver the policy, refused to do so on learning that M. B.
the previous day had contracted a severe cold. Prior to taking the cold,
M. D. was an insurable risk, but thereafter and until her death he was not.
A reasonable time for delivery of the policy after the application was ten
days, while in fact thirty days elapsed before the attempted delivery. A
reasonable time for delivery after receipt at the Indianapolis office was
twenty-four hours, while the actual time elapsed was nine days after receipt. R. B. as administrator of M. B. sued for damages for failure to act
promptly on the application, and for' failure to deliver the policy promptly,
before M. B. became ill. Verdict and judgment were for plaintiff. Held,
that judgment must be reversed. The basis for reversal was stated to 43e
that the company owed no duty either statutory or contractual; and that,
without a duty being imposed, the company was not liable for unreasonable
delay. The "tort liability doctrine" was stated to be inapplicable since the
premium was not paid in advance. Metropolitan Insurance Co. V. Brady,
Appellate Court of Indiana, Dec. 30, 1930, 174 N. E. 99.
The application was treated as an offer for a unilateral contract to be
accepted by delivery of the policy. This offer was rejected, and a counter
offer for a unilateral contract made by sending a substitute policy, which
was to be accepted by payment of the first premium. Since there was no
delivery, there could be no acceptance, and no contract was consumated.
The court was correct therefore in saying that no contract duty arose to act
promptly, since there was no contract. The court did not repudiate the
tort liability doctrine, but it made the distinction that it did not apply to
cases in which the premius was not paid in advance. The cases depending
upon tort liability have been cases in which the premium was paid in advance, Duffie v. Bankers Ass'n, 160 Ia. 19, 139 N. W. 1087, being a typical
example. For a criticism of placing contract limitations on this tort liability, see 40 Yale L. J. 121 (1930).
The distinction made in this case overlooks the stipulation which permitted the payment of the premium on the delivery of the policy. Yet the
court in touching on the agent's representation that it was not necessary to
pay it until the delivery of the policy, when the premium was offered with
the application, stated that it was not inconsistent with the application.
Though payment of the premium is stated to be one of the elements on
which tort liability is based, it is but one of the conditions for the application of the duty to act with reasonable promptness. Nor does it seem logical
to consider it the most important, since the applicant is permitted to reject
the policy and recover the premium. Another element is that the applicant

